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It is difficult to define an action for a declaratory judgment.
It may be described and compared to other actions; its utility
may be discussed and its origins traced with accuracy. This
material is already available,' and the Bar is indebted to Pro-
fessor Borchard. The definition of the action and its proper'
classification in the armory of legal remedies remains to be
worked out in practice by the lawyers and the courts. It may be
suggested that the action for a declaratory judgment is an
aggregate of operative facts giving rise to right-duty relations
between the parties.2 It indicates that these relations are in dis-
pute; that the plaintiff is thereby in a position of peril and
insecurity and he asks that relief be given him by declaring his
rights. The judgment rendered is the determination or sen-
tence of the law that a legal relation does or does not exist.'
That such a judgment is reviewable requires no discussion,
since the act itself provides that declaratory judgments "may
be reviewed as other orders, judgments and decrees."' This
wording is not particularly helpful to the practicing lawyer
when he is faced with the choice of a method of review. Of
course the judgment is reviewable by proceedings in error,' and
perhaps this is the most satisfactory method to use. It is prob-
able that the great majority of declaratory judgment cases will
be submitted upon agreed statements of fact, or that the facts
will be found separately by the court or jury. The complaint of
the party seeking review in such a case will be in regard to the
application of the law to the facts. He will contend that the
court erroneously declared that certain jural relations existed
'Borchard, "Declaratory Judgments," Banks Baldwin Law Publishing Co. 1934.
'Clark, "The Code Cause of Action," 33 Yale L. J. S1, 837.
3 Borchard, "Declaratory Judgments," 7 Tulane L. R. 183.
'O.G.C. 12102-7.
O.G.C. 12247.
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or did not exist. This may be conveniently presented to the.
reviewing court by petition in error. Such a proceeding in error
would not differ from any other; all questions, including weight
of the evidence, might be taken up on a record prepared as in
ordinary actions.
In Ohio, however, the aggrieved party may have the case
reviewed by appeal, if it is a chancery case.' He may desire
review by this method for various reasons; he may regard it
less technical; it may be less expensive, or he may desire a trial
de novo rather than a review of the record. Whatever the rea-
son, the right cannot be denied. The determination of the right
to appeal turns solely upon the question, Is the action a chan-
cery case?
It is unfortunate that the procedural distinctions between
law and equity are still preserved in Ohio. They are adminis-
tered by the same courts; the process and pleading are the
same, but nevertheless the difference persists, and arises from
time to time to plague the practicing lawyer. No authority need
be cited to point out to him the danger in making the wrong
guess and in attempting to appeal a case which the court holds
to be an action at law.
The Supreme Court has recognized the difficulty of the
question, and has said:
"We will not attempt to categorically and finally answer the
much-mooted question, What is a chancery case? It would be a diffi-
cult if not dangerous thing to do and of doubtful benefit. It ought,
however, the be approached, generally speaking, not from the modern
viewpoint, but rather from the old-time conception. Especially would
this be so with reference to well-recognized equitable remedies known
to the courts prior to the adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure. This
much, however, may safely be said. A chancery case is one in which,
according to the usages and practices in courts of chancery prior to and
at the time of the adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure, remedies
were awarded in accordance with the principles of equity and not in
accordance with rules of law. And the proper definition of the term in
our new Constitution cannot be regarded as affected by the provisions
of statutes relating to appeals nor by the introduction bodily of equitable
remedies into our statutes. It would not do, however, to lay down the
hard and fast rule that only such chancery cases as were known to that
period of our legal history could have been intended by the constitution
makers as being the cases subject to appeal. The changing condition
6 Ohio Constitution Article IV Section 6.
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of the times, development along new lines, the springing up of new
problems, progress in many of the avenues of life-these things beget
new rights and obligations that call for new equitable remedies. Equity
is not only elastic as to its remedies, but is is progressive. Its principles
are indeed immutable, founded as they are on exact justice and equality
before the law, but equitable remedies are constantly subject to enlarge-
ment. These considerations make it manifest, therefore, that an all-
embracing and satisfactory definition of chancery case would be most
difficult to obtain, and if obtainable, might well promote injustice rather
than justice.'
The court here is looking at the remedy and it suggests that
there may be new remedies. The action for a declaratory judg-
ment is a new remedy; but is it a new equitable remedy? The
action, says Professor Borchard, was born under equitable
auspices and has preponderantly equitable affiliations.' It has
many characteristics of an equitable remedy. It is conceivable
that the courts might lay down a simple rule, that the action for
a declaratory judgment is an equitable remedy and hence ap-
pealable. If such a rule were limited to appellate practice it
might not be objectionable. It would have the advantage of
certainty. However, it could not be so limited and many un-
fortunate holdings would result. The effect would be the same
as holding that the action for declaratory judgment was avail-
able only on the equity side of the court. Ohio, then, under the
unform declaratory judgment act, would be in the same posi-
tion as New South Wales, Florida, and Rhode Island where
the declaratory judgment is available only in courts of equity.
The plain fact is that the remedy is not alone considered in
determining whether a case is legal or equitable. In an Ohio
case action was brought against an administrator charging that
he had made a fraudulent settlement of his accounts and that
he had fraudulently sold real estate. The plaintiff prayed for
judgment in the sum of $6ooo. In determining whether the
case was appealable, although the remedy demanded was a
money judgment, the court said, "If we look to the prayer
of the petition alone, it plainly appears to be an action for the
recovery of money only. But if we look to the case made, or
the facts stated in the petition, it plainly appears to be an action
to set aside a fraudulent settlement, and to compel an account
by an administrator or trustee. . . . The action is not one in
7 Wagner v. Armstrong, 93 Ohio St. 443, 456, 113 N.E. 397-
* Borchard, op. cit., 178.
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which a jury trial is demandable as of right, and the parties had
the right of appeal."9
Again the Supreme Court has said:
"In discussing the question by which the extent of equity jurisdic-
tion is to be tested and practically determined, it is stated in I Pomeroy's
Equity Jurisprudence, 3 d ed. §62, that 'the question is . . . whether
the circumstances and relations presented by the particular case are fairly
embraced within any of the settled principles and heads of jurisdiction
which are generally acknowledged as constituting the department of
equity.' It is further said that one of the results which follows is that
'a court of equity will not, unless perhaps in some very exceptional case,
assume jurisdiction over a controversy the facts of which do not bring
it within some general principle or acknowledged head of the equitable
jurisprudence'."'
In England the first declatory judgment act in 1852 pro-
vided that the Chancery Court might make "binding declara-
tions of right without granting consequential relief." It would
seem that court might have construed this to give them the
power to administer a new equitable remedy in any case in
which it was demanded, whether the rights involved were legal
or equitable. The court limited the act, however, to those cases
cognizable traditionally in chancery where other equitable relief
might have been demanded.11 In 1883 the power to render
declaratory judgments was extended to the law side of the
High Court.
In England the question is not frequently raised since the
procedural distinction between law and equity is only nominally
maintained. In an action on the chancery side to declare void
a mortgage, the respondent contended that since the action was
in equity the plaintiff should do equity by tendering the actual
consideration. In denying this contention Cozens-Hardy, M.R.
said:
"The simple answer is that this is not equitable relief. It is a mere
accident that the judgment has been given in the Chancery Division and
not in the King's Bench Division, since this action might perfectly well
have been brought in the Common Law Courts."' 2
New South Wales, where the remedy is limited to Chancery
0 Reed's Admr. v. Reed et al, z5 Ohio St. 44z (x874).
10 Building Show Co. v. Albertson, 99 Ohio St. 11, 121 N.E. 817.
"Bormhard, op. Cit., p. 241.
Bankes, L. J. in Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay & Co. (19IS) 2 K. B. 536, 538.
C2 hapman v. Michaelson (i9og) I Ch. 738.
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court, takes the contrary view and holds that where a legal right
is sought to be declared the court has not jurisdiction. 3
In Florida there seems to be a tendency for the Chancery
courts to regard the remedy as equitable and to take jurisdiction
in cases that would not otherwise come before them. A suit for
interpretation of a will was held maintainable even though no
equitable estates were involved."
In New Jersey where the separation of the courts of law
and equity is rigidly maintained the courts look at the case and
not at the remedy to determine jurisdiction. If the question
is one of law, equity will not take jurisdiction."
The question sometimes arises as to the right of trial by
jury. Where a corporation sought a declaration as to its con-
tractual obligation to 381 defendants and prayed for "further
equitable relief" the court held that the action was one at law
since only legal rights were involved. The plaintiff contended
that the action was in equity under the doctrine of avoidance
of multiplicity of actions. The court said:
"Some generations ago, principles of equity were administered only
by courts of equity. But our courts administer both equity and law.
Heretofore an action in equity, without the right of trial by jury, was
necessary in order to enforce the principle against multiciplicity of actions.
But surely the principle exists without reference to the court in which it
is applied or the particular form in which it may be administered; and
though a case may in some respects require the application of a principle
of equity, it does not on that account necessarily lose the characteristics
of an action at law. And simply because the court without a jury must
determine whether the rule against multiplicity of action is applicable,
does not, we think, hinder the determination of the facts in the case by
a jury, as is provided for in section 9 of the Declaratory Judgments Act.
In the instant case, a number of parties, though having separate con-
tracts, have a community of interest in the facts and the law involved
herein. That, under the circumstances of this case, gave rise to the
application of the principle of equity that a multiplicity of actions should
be avoided by joining all in one suit. But the action may, nevertheless,
be called one (at law if you please) under the Declaratory Judgments
Act. An action thereunder is not one heretofore known (except to a
limited extent), and if a plaintiff invokes that act, he must submit to its
terms. The facts in the case, in so far as material, might accordingly,
have been submitted to a jury, had that been demanded."' 6
13 Langman v. Handover (1929) 43 C.L.R. 334.
Roberts et al v. Mosely (1930) 5oo Fla. z67, 529 So. 834-
Di Fablo v. Southard (1930) io6 N. J. Eq. 157, xio Atl. 748.
'c Holly Sugar Corporation v. Fritzler et al., (x931) 42 Wyo. 446, z96 Pac. 2o6.
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In actions to construe a will the Ohio Courts have held that
the subject matter of the action must be examined to determine
whether the case was appealable. In Gearart v Richardsowe'
the court found that a charitable trust was involved and the
action was held to be appealable. In Oglesbee v Mille6 Exr. an
action was brought under O.G.C. 8593 to forfeit a life estate
on the ground of waste. It was held that the action was at law
and not appealable. The court said:
"In the final analysis this is a case involving the determination of a
legal title and for the recovery of specific real property. If the case be
said to have any of the characteristics of a suit in chancery, these are
merely incidental to the principal relief prayed for.""8
In Crowley, Admr. v Crowley et al the Supreme Court
again considered the apepalability of an action to construe a
will. The opinion might well have been written in a declara-
tory judgment action. Marshall, C. J. said:
"Each year a large number of cases are appealed from the trial
courts to the Courts of Appeals, only to be dismissed because they are
not in fact chancery cases; and not a few of them each year are carried
to the Supreme Court on the constitutional ground, where they are
again dismissed because the particular question is no longer debatable.
It frequently results that meritorious cases are denied review because of
the mistaken remedy, and that substance is sacrificed for form. The
mistake is not always that of the novitiate. Seasoned lawyers and experi-
enced judges frequently differ in opinion as to the appealability of given
cases. It has become a seriously mooted question whether the constitu-
tional amendment of 1912 was not a serious mistake. If so, it is a polit-
ical problem which courts may not correct by the process of interpreta-
tion. In the overwhelming majority of cases the question of appeala-
bility can be solved with certainty by patient research in the principles
of equity jurisprudence. There is, however, a twilight zone of cases
where the difficulty is a real one. In such cases it becomes necessary to
search both the English and American authorities to ascertain what has
been decided by English courts of chancery and American courts of
equity.
Equity is a separate system of jurisprudence whose principles are
universal among jurisdictions which administer the common law. It is
as old and its principles are as fixed and permanent as those of the
common law itself. It follows that the basis of American equity juris-
prudence must be found in the equity jurisdiction of the high court of
chancery in England. It finds its basis and its concept in English equity
1' Gearhart v. Richardson, iog Ohio St. 418 (1924.).
x' Oglesbee v. Miller, i25 Ohio St. 223, 227 (932).
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jurisprudence, yet it finds no limitations anywhere. It is progressive and
expands and develops with the progressive changes of modern civiliza-
tion; yet, as was declared in Wagner v. Zrmstrong, supra, "the term
in our new Constitution cannot be regarded as affected by the provisions
of statutes relating to appeals nor by the introduction bodily of equitable
remedies into our statutes."
Following that declaration, it must be said that Section 10857,
General Code, does not create new, equitable remedies. That statute
provides a legal remedy for construction of wills involving only legal
estates. It must be held that on the equity side of the court of common
pleas that section only authorizes the direction and judgment of the
court in matters where trust estates are involved, and that as to all other
matters they are heard on the law side of the court.
If the legislature should be declared to have the right to provide an
equitable remedy, and make it the basis of appeal as a chancery case it
would follow that it would be in the power of the legislature to mate-
rially change the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals."' 9
The types of action considered in these cases are analogous
to the action for a declaratory judgment. They lay a basis for
a rule as to appeal in such actions.
The actions for a declatory judgment is available on both
sides of the court; it is an appropriate remedy to determine
either legal or equitable rights. If such a judgment is rendered
determining purely legal rights then the case is at law and
review must be had by way of error proceedings. If, however,
a judgment declares equitable rights and interests then review
may be had either by error or appeal. Such a rule is consistent
with Ohio cases in related fields, is workable and will tend to
keep the action flexible, and readily adaptable to widely differ-
ent states of fact.
10 Crowley, Admr. v. Crowley, X24 Ohio St. 454, 47 (i931).
